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THE NEUTRALIZATION OF DRAPER-STYLE 
EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENTS FROM EVIL
William Lauinger
This paper aims to neutralize Draper-style evidential arguments from evil by 
defending five theses: (1) that, when those who advance these arguments use 
the word “evil,” they are referring, at least in large part, to ill-being; (2) that 
well-being and ill-being come as a pair (i.e., are essentially related); (3) that 
well-being and ill-being are best understood in an at least partly objectivist 
way; (4) that (even partial) objectivism about well-being and ill-being is best 
understood as implying non-naturalism about well-being and ill-being; and 
(5) that the truth of non-naturalism about well-being and ill-being does not fit 
cleanly with naturalism and, in fact, fits at least as well with theism as it does 
with naturalism.
1. Introduction
Draper-style evidential arguments from evil say (in effect) that, because 
the world’s terrible evil and suffering fit far better with naturalism 
than they do with theism, we have strong prima facie reasons to accept 
naturalism over theism.1 This paper aims to neutralize these sorts of argu-
ments by defending five theses: (1) that, when those who advance these 
arguments use the word “evil,” they are referring, at least in large part, 
to ill-being; (2) that well-being and ill-being come as a pair (i.e., are es-
sentially related); (3) that well-being and ill-being are best understood in 
an at least partly objectivist way; (4) that (even partial) objectivism about 
well-being and ill-being is best understood as implying non-naturalism 
about well-being and ill-being; and (5) that the truth of non-naturalism 
about well-being and ill-being does not fit cleanly with naturalism and, in 
fact, fits at least as well with theism as it does with naturalism. Theses (1) 
and (2) are fairly uncontroversial. However, each of theses (3) through (5) 
is very controversial, and in this paper I cannot offer a full argument for 
any one of them. Nevertheless, I can show that there are good reasons for 
thinking that each is true.
1Paul Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” Nous (1989), 331–
350; Paul Draper, “Evolution and the Problem of Evil,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 
5th edition, ed. Louis Pojman and Michael Rea (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 
207–219; and Paul Draper, “The Argument from Evil,” in Philosophy of Religion: Classic and 
Contemporary Issues, ed. Paul Copan and Chad Meister (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2008), 142–155. 
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Let me stress that I will be focusing only on Draper-style evidential 
arguments from evil.2 As I have indicated, these arguments put two spe-
cific hypotheses on the table, theism and naturalism, and then claim that, 
since naturalism does a much better job of explaining (or fitting with) the 
world’s terrible evil and suffering than theism does, we have strong prima 
facie reasons to favor naturalism over theism. For my purposes in this 
paper, it is important that there be a specific alternative to theism on the 
table, namely, naturalism. For, indeed, my main point will be that Draper-
style evidential arguments from evil fail because they assume, wrongly, 
that naturalism and evil fit cleanly together.
The word “naturalism” here refers to metaphysical naturalism, which 
does not deny the existence of non-natural entities, but which does entail 
that natural entities have only natural causes and that there are no su-
pernatural entities (e.g., God).3 Moreover, in this paper I am construing 
naturalism in a way that rules out appeals to teleological laws of nature 
such as those that Nagel invokes in his recent book.4 In short, readers 
should assume that by “naturalism” I mean “ordinary, non-teleological 
naturalism.”5
Here is a roadmap for what follows. Section 2 will motivate the move 
of defending theses (1) through (5), that is, the five theses mentioned in 
the first paragraph of this paper. Then section 3 will defend theses (1) 
through (3), and section 4 will defend theses (4) and (5). I will conclude 
with section 5, which will discuss one additional objection to the move of 
defending theses (1) through (5).
2. Motivating the Move of Defending Theses (1)–(5)
Evil and suffering are bad in themselves, but they can have significant in-
strumental value (e.g., people can become more compassionate as a result 
of having endured some suffering). Given this point, we might be inclined 
to claim that God chose to create a world containing evil and suffering 
because our lives are, on the whole, better in a world with evil and suf-
fering than in a world without evil and suffering. This claim might be hard 
to deny if evil and suffering were never terrible. Yet, once we admit that the 
world contains plenty of terrible evil and suffering, this claim seems very 
strained. And, of course, the world does contain plenty of terrible evil and 
suffering.
2Regarding the difference in form between Draper-style evidential arguments from evil 
and other sorts of evidential arguments from evil, see Draper, “The Argument from Evil,” 
146–150. 
3Ibid., 149–150. 
4Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature 
is Almost Certainly False (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). In sketching his version 
of naturalism, Nagel invokes teleological laws of nature that make the respective existences 
of life, consciousness, reason, and non-naturalistically construed objective values things that 
are to be expected (i.e., antecedently highly probable).
5I am mentioning this because it is not clear to me that there is a problem of ill-fit between 
naturalism and evil if we construe naturalism in the teleological way that Nagel does.
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One might react to the foregoing by thinking: “Given theism, the 
world’s terrible evil and suffering is extraordinarily hard to understand. 
This is so because one would think that, although an all-loving, omni-
scient, and omnipotent being may well allow for plenty of non-terrible 
evil and suffering, he would prevent the occurrence of all or at least most 
of the terrible evil and suffering that occurs in our world. By contrast, if 
naturalism is true, the world’s terrible evil and suffering is not hard to 
understand. After all, if naturalism is true, then what lies at the base of 
all of reality is, say, indifferent matter that swirls around in accordance 
with similarly indifferent laws of nature; and surely, if reality is ultimately 
indifferent, then it is not surprising that various pockets of reality contain 
terrible evil and suffering. The take-away point here is that the antecedent 
probability of the world’s terrible evil and suffering is much higher on 
naturalism than it is on theism. As such is the case, we have strong prima 
facie reasons to accept naturalism over theism. Granted, naturalism and 
theism are not the only possible views of ultimate reality. But, for sim-
plicity, we can restrict our options to just naturalism and theism.”
The above comments capture the heart of Draper-style evidential 
arguments from evil (henceforth I will simply refer to these arguments 
as “Draper-style arguments”). In response to Draper-style arguments, 
there are (at least) four sorts of moves that theists might make: the 
counterbalancing-or-overriding-considerations move, the theodicies move, the 
skeptical-theism move, and the naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-cleanly-together 
move. The last of these, the naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-cleanly-together move, 
consists in defending the five theses mentioned in the first paragraph of 
this paper.
The idea behind the counterbalancing-or-overriding-considerations move is 
to grant that Draper-style arguments give us strong prima facie reasons 
to embrace naturalism over theism and then to produce considerations 
that favor theism over naturalism, where these considerations have 
counterbalancing or overriding force (e.g., theists might advance the fine-
tuning argument and claim that it has counterbalancing or overriding 
force). Theists may succeed if they make this move, but, so as to ease their 
argumentative burdens, it would be best for theists if they could block 
Draper-style arguments from the start.
One way to try to do this is to appeal to extant theodicies, that is, to 
make the theodicies move. The goal here would be to show that the world’s 
terrible evil and suffering actually fit well with theism. I (who am a theist) 
believe that, although appeals to extant theodicies can to some extent ex-
plain why the world’s terrible evil and suffering fit with theism, serious 
worries about the friction or lack of fit between the world’s terrible evil 
and suffering (on the one hand) and theism (on the other hand) will still 
linger even after all extant theodicies have been considered. Also, I think 
that most theists, if asked directly, would agree with my belief here. Given 
this belief, and given also that Draper is right that the world’s terrible evil 
and suffering fit cleanly with naturalism and its assumption that reality 
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is ultimately indifferent, it follows that naturalism still seems to explain 
the world’s terrible evil and suffering far better than theism, in which case 
it also follows that we still have strong prima facie reasons to embrace 
naturalism over theism.
At this point theists might make the skeptical-theism move. Here theists 
might say: “We are in no position to know that there is any friction or lack 
of fit between the world’s terrible evil and suffering (on the one hand) and 
theism (on the other hand). In order for us to know such a thing as that, 
we would need to know how likely or unlikely it is that God would create 
and sustain a world that contains the sort of terrible evil and suffering that 
our world contains; and, in order for us to know such a thing as that, we 
would need to have a decent grasp of the reasons that God might have for 
and against creating and sustaining a world of the sort in question. But, 
since God’s intellect is infinite whereas our intellects are finite, it seems 
that we cannot have a decent grasp of God’s reasons generally or, more 
particularly, of the reasons that God might have for and against creating 
and sustaining a world of the sort in question.”6
Draper has responded to this sort of skeptical-theistic response by 
emphasizing that what primarily matters for his argument is what we 
know about the reasons that God would have, not what we do not know 
about the reasons that God would have.7 Here is what Draper seems to 
be thinking. We are asking ourselves which hypothesis, theism or natu-
ralism, is antecedently more probable, given the world’s terrible evil and 
suffering. Put differently, we are asking which of these two hypotheses 
does a better job of explaining (or fitting with) the world’s terrible evil 
and suffering. If naturalism is true, then reality is ultimately indifferent, 
in which case it is unsurprising that various pockets of reality happen to 
contain terrible evil and suffering. But now turn to theism. Given theism, 
should we expect various pockets of reality to contain terrible evil and 
suffering? No, we should not. Because God is all-loving, he would have 
reasons to prevent terrible evil and suffering on the part of humans and 
animals; and, because God is omniscient and omnipotent, he would 
deploy these reasons with utter efficacy. Of course, it is possible (for all 
we know) that God would also have distinct, overriding reasons—ones 
beyond our ken—to allow for terrible evil and suffering on the part of 
humans and animals. For the sake of the argument, though, we can hold 
equal or bracket all of the reasons that God might have that are beyond 
our ken. This holding equal or bracketing move is justified not only be-
cause these (possible) reasons are unknown to us, but also because it does 
not seem any more likely that God would have reasons beyond our ken to 
permit terrible evil and suffering than it is that God would have reasons 
6This paragraph follows (at least loosely) van Inwagen—see Peter van Inwagen, “The 
Problem of Evil, the Problem of Air, and the Problem of Silence,” in The Evidential Argument 
from Evil, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 155.
7Draper, “The Argument from Evil,” 152–153.
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beyond our ken to prevent terrible evil and suffering (i.e., it seems just as 
likely that God’s reasons that are unknown to us are ones to prevent ter-
rible evil and suffering as it is that they are ones to permit terrible evil and 
suffering). Thus Draper’s argument can be put as follows. Given what we 
know about the reasons that God would have and holding equal or bracketing all 
that we do not know about the reasons that God would have, we should accept:
(a) that the world’s terrible evil and suffering do not fit well with (i.e., 
are surprising on) theism,
(b) that the world’s terrible evil and suffering do fit well with (i.e., are 
not surprising on) naturalism, and
(c) that we therefore have strong prima facie reasons to embrace natu-
ralism over theism.
What can theists say in response to Draper’s argument when it is for-
mulated in this way? I think that (a) should be granted. If we are taking 
into account only what we know about the reasons that God would 
have (and so are bracketing or holding equal all that we do not know 
about the reasons that God would have), then it is clear, for the reasons 
mentioned above, that the world’s terrible evil and suffering do not fit 
well with theism. (My point here is not that evil and suffering as such 
do not fit well with theism. Rather, my point here is that terrible evil 
and suffering, especially in the quantities found here on earth, do not fit 
well with theism—or, more precisely, do not fit well with theism if we 
are taking into account only what we know about the reasons that God 
would have.)
Given that (a) should be granted, what can theists say? Theists might 
grant (a) and (b) but then question (c) by saying: “Given that Draper’s 
argument requires us to bracket so much, it is no longer much of an argu-
ment—that is, it gives us nothing but weak prima facie reasons to embrace 
naturalism over theism.” This response may have merit. Still, it would ob-
viously be better for theists if they could convincingly claim that Draper’s 
argument does not give us any prima facie reasons to embrace naturalism 
over theism.
Thus I propose that we consider (b): the claim that the world’s terrible 
evil and suffering fit well with naturalism. Draper is confident that (b) 
is true, but I think that theists can successfully block (b) by making the 
naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-cleanly-together move.
3. Defending Theses (1)–(3)
Theses (1)–(3) of the naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-cleanly-together move are 
as follows: (1) When those who advance Draper-style arguments use the 
word “evil,” they are referring, at least in large part, to ill-being; (2) well-
being and ill-being come as a pair (i.e., are essentially related); and (3) 
well-being and ill-being are best understood in an at least partly objec-
tivist way. What reasons are there for believing these three theses?
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Start with thesis (1). Draper and other proponents of arguments from 
evil focus heavily on pain and suffering when they are discussing the 
evils of the world. They do this at least partly because pain and suffering 
are obvious examples of things that are directly (i.e., non-instrumentally) 
bad for humans and animals. In other words, they do this at least partly 
because pain and suffering are obvious components of the ill-being of hu-
mans and animals. This suffices to show that thesis (1) is true.
Turn now to thesis (2), which says that well-being and ill-being come as 
a pair (i.e., are essentially related). This thesis is fairly uncontroversial. It 
can be understood to imply (a) that, insofar as an individual’s well-being 
is increased, this individual’s ill-being is decreased, and (b) that, insofar 
as an individual’s ill-being is increased, this individual’s well-being is 
decreased. Further, notice that, although we can appropriately speak of 
an individual’s well-being and ill-being, these are in fact two (essentially 
related) aspects of some one thing, where this one thing can be improved 
or diminished or stay at the same level. In what follows I will, for conve-
nience, sometimes speak only of an individual’s well-being, as opposed to 
speaking of an individual’s well-being and ill-being. (Also, for convenience, 
I will from now on use “well-being” and “ill-being” to refer specifically to 
human well-being and ill-being.)
Now consider thesis (3). This thesis says that well-being and ill-being 
are best understood in an at least partly objectivist way. In advancing this 
thesis, I mean to be claiming that the best theory of well-being is either 
a purely objectivist one or a hybrid one. On a purely objectivist theory, 
there are various basic goods (e.g., accomplishment, knowledge, aesthetic 
experience, health, pleasure, and friendship), where each of these basic 
goods is directly good for each human, and where this holds true regard-
less of the pro-attitudes (e.g., the desires) that each human has or lacks.8 
On a hybrid theory, the basic goods are appealed to, but they are not as-
sumed to be components of people’s well-being from the start—that is, the 
basic goods are assumed at the start to be valuable in some pro-attitude 
independent sense, but not in the sense of directly contributing to well-
being. What, on a hybrid theory, makes any given basic good become a 
component of well-being? The answer is that, if (and only if) someone has 
the right sort of pro-attitude (be it enjoyment, or desire, or endorsement, 
etc.) toward any given basic good, then this basic good thereby becomes a 
component of this person’s well-being. In sum, although both purely ob-
jectivist theories and hybrid theories appeal to the basic goods, purely 
objectivist theories assume that all of the basic goods are components of 
one’s well-being from the start, whereas hybrid theories assume instead 
that, for each basic good, it cannot count as a component of one’s well-
being unless one has the right sort of pro-attitude toward it. With regard 
to ill-being: On a purely objectivist theory, any given human’s ill-being can 
8For an example of a purely objectivist theory, see John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural 
Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 59–99. 
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be understood in terms of the frustrating of his or her ability to engage in 
or benefit from any of the basic goods; and, on a hybrid theory, any given 
human’s ill-being can be understood in terms of the frustrating of his or 
her ability to engage in or benefit from any of those basic goods that are 
components of his or her well-being.
Thesis (3) is extremely controversial. It asserts that we should be either 
pure objectivists or hybrid theorists about well-being. However, many 
philosophers are either welfare hedonists or desire-fulfillment welfare 
theorists; and, though Draper himself is an objectivist about well-being, it 
seems likely that some philosophers who accept Draper-style arguments 
are either welfare hedonists or desire-fulfillment welfare theorists.9 I will 
now provide reasons for rejecting both welfare hedonism and desire-
fulfillment welfare theories, starting with welfare hedonism.
Welfare hedonism entails (a) that nothing except one’s own mental states 
(in particular, one’s own pleasure, pain, enjoyment, and suffering) can enter 
the content of one’s well-being. Moreover, standard versions of welfare he-
donism entail (b) that the welfare-value or welfare-disvalue of the mental 
states that enter the content of one’s welfare cannot be directly affected by 
anything except one’s own mental states. There are non-standard versions 
of welfare hedonism that reject (b), but, for now, we can focus solely on 
standard versions of welfare hedonism.
It is well known that cases of delusion pose serious problems for standard 
versions of welfare hedonism. An example from Sumner will help here:
Consider the woman who for months or years has believed in, and relied 
on, the devotion of a faithless and self-serving partner. Her belief concern-
ing a crucial condition of her life—a state of the world—was false. . . . If 
you ask her during this period whether she is happy, she will say she is; 
if you ask her whether her life is going well for her she will say that it is. 
If you ask her how she sees the same period after the delusion has been 
exposed, she will probably say that it now seems to her a cruel hoax and 
a waste of that part of her life. Clearly she now thinks that her life was not 
going well then; she has retrospectively re-evaluated her well-being during 
that period.10
It may make things clearer here if we divide Sumner’s example into two 
separate cases.
First Case: The woman lives her actual life, that is, the life where she is 
deluded about her partner’s faithfulness.
Second Case: The woman lives a life that is the same as her actual life, 
except that her partner is faithful to her.
9Draper noted to me through email correspondence that he is an objectivist about well-
being. His welfare-objectivism can also be inferred from his writings (e.g., in “The Argument 
from Evil” he uses “flourishing” and “languishing” to refer to well-being and ill-being, and 
he uses these terms in a welfare-objectivist way).
10L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 157.
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The woman has qualitatively identical mental states in both cases (i.e., her 
life is the same “on the inside” in both cases). Therefore, if we accept any 
standard version of welfare hedonism, we must say that the woman is 
equally well off in the two cases. But the truth seems to be that the woman 
is faring far better in the second case than in the first case.
Aside from biting the bullet, a welfare hedonist might respond by 
moving to a non-standard version of welfare hedonism. More specifically, 
a welfare hedonist might revise his or her theory so that, although it still 
entails (a) that nothing except one’s own mental states (in particular, one’s 
own pleasure, pain, enjoyment, and suffering) can enter the content of 
one’s well-being, it now also entails (b) that something besides one’s own 
mental states (in particular, some standard of reality or truth) can play a 
direct role in determining the welfare-value of at least some of the mental 
states that enter the content of one’s well-being.
Feldman’s truth-adjusted version of welfare hedonism is an example 
of a welfare theory that entails both conditions (a) and (b).11 With regard 
to condition (b), Feldman’s version of welfare hedonism asserts that, 
although all of the pleasures that one has enhance one’s welfare, the plea-
sures that one has that are grounded in true beliefs are worth ten times 
more, welfare-wise, than the pleasures that one has that are grounded in 
false beliefs. If we accept Feldman’s version of welfare hedonism, then, 
regarding the two cases that involve the woman from Sumner’s example, 
we can say: “The woman is faring well in both cases, since she is, on bal-
ance, experiencing more pleasure than pain in both cases. However, the 
woman’s welfare is ten times higher in the second case than in the first 
case, because the pleasures that she experiences in the second case are 
reality-based pleasures, whereas the pleasures that she experiences in the 
first case are delusion-based pleasures.”
Though Feldman’s truth-adjusted version of welfare hedonism cor-
rectly implies that the woman is faring much better in the second case than 
in the first case, it also implies that the woman is faring well in the first 
case, that is, in some minimal way. And this latter implication seems false, 
for the truth seems to be that the woman is faring poorly in the first case. 
After all, as Sumner says in relation to the first case, the woman, when 
looking back on her time spent with her faithless and self-serving partner, 
is apt (correctly) to deem the whole thing to have been “a cruel hoax and 
a waste of that part of her life.”
Feldman could try to fix this problem by claiming that delusion-based 
pleasures actually diminish one’s welfare. But, if Feldman were so to claim, 
then it would be clear that we are no longer working with a theory that 
prizes pleasure or enjoyment and the absence of pain or suffering above 
11Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility 
of Hedonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 109–114. For simplicity, I am here ignoring 
Feldman’s distinction between sensory and attitudinal pleasures.
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all else, in which case it would be clear that we are no longer working with 
a version of welfare hedonism at all.
Stepping back, we now have good (albeit, I admit, perhaps not deci-
sive) reasons for rejecting welfare hedonism in general. Let us now turn to 
desire-fulfillment theories (DF theories).
DF theories divide into two general types: the actual and the hypo-
thetical. On an actual DF theory, one’s well-being is wholly determined by, 
and hence reducible to, one’s actual desires. The idea here is that, if you 
desire some (any) state, then this state thereby becomes directly good for 
you. Moreover, if this state obtains, your well-being is thereby advanced. 
Regarding ill-being, actual DF theorists typically claim that it consists in 
(and only in) having one’s desires frustrated. Hypothetical DF theories are 
structurally similar to actual DF theories, except that, instead of relying 
on actual desires, they rely on hypothetical desires—that is, the desires 
that one would have if one were in some non-actual, idealized setting (say, 
a setting wherein one has just been fully and vividly informed with re-
spect to non-evaluative information).12 Also, both actual and hypothetical 
DF theories entail that the desires that determine one’s well-being are 
non-instrumental desires. (For brevity, I always use “desire” to mean “non-
instrumental desire.”)
Actual DF theories are implausible. They implausibly imply (a) that a 
person cannot fail to desire something that is directly good for him or her, 
and they implausibly imply (b) that everything that a person desires is 
directly good for him or her.
Start here with implication (a): People sometimes stumble upon activi-
ties that they have never previously encountered or known about and find 
that they love them (e.g., this could happen with wind-surfing). With re-
gard to these cases, it seems that the relationship of prudential fit (i.e., the 
directly-good-for relationship) between the activity in question and the 
person in question is in place prior to this person’s coming to know about 
this activity and so prior to this person’s forming the desire to engage in 
this activity. This suggests that there are plenty of things that are directly 
good for people but that they do not desire, simply because they do not 
know about them.
Turn now to implication (b). It is hard to deny that there are people 
who desire money, fame, and power—here, for instance, we might think 
of Donald Trump and his passion for money, certain reality TV stars and 
their passion for fame, and Saddam Hussein and his passion for power. 
Yet, when we ask ourselves whether money, fame, and power can be di-
rectly good for people, we are apt to answer that, although these things can 
obviously be indirectly (i.e., instrumentally) good for people, they cannot 
be directly good for people. Actual DF theorists might protest: “But, if the 
people who want these things judge that these things are directly good 
12For an example of a hypothetical DF theory, see Peter Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 43–68. 
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for themselves, then why should we deny that these things are directly 
good for them? Shouldn’t it be their judgments that matter here, not our 
judgments? After all, it is their well-being that is at issue, not ours.” This 
protest can be turned against actual DF theories, for people often judge 
that they themselves are no better or even worse off for having had cer-
tain of their desires fulfilled.13 For example, someone might desire to get 
a certain job (or to take a certain class, or to go on a certain trip, etc.), have 
his or her desire fulfilled, and then judge (either immediately or after time 
has passed) that he or she is no better or even worse off for having had 
this desire fulfilled. Sometimes these judgments are dramatic and concern 
significant stretches of one’s life, as when Augustine eventually judged 
that his having been a Manichee was directly bad for himself, even though 
he had wanted to be a Manichee.14 With regard to these kinds of cases, 
actual DF theorists must claim that these individuals are mistaken when 
they judge that they are no better or even worse off for having had certain 
of their desires fulfilled. But, if actual DF theorists are willing to admit that 
people’s judgments concerning their own welfare can be mistaken in these 
kinds of cases, then it is hard to take actual DF theorists seriously if and 
when they claim that we should not question the judgments of Donald 
Trump, certain reality TV stars, and Saddam Hussein, that is, in relation to 
the welfare-value of money, fame, and power.
How do hypothetical DF theories fare in relation to implications (a) and 
(b) from above? Regarding implication (a): Hypothetical DF theories or-
dinarily employ full-information conditions; that is, they ordinarily entail 
that an individual’s well-being is determined by what he or she would de-
sire after he or she has vividly internalized all of the value-free facts there 
are. Thus hypothetical DF theories are ordinarily not plagued with the 
problem of individuals not knowing about, and so not desiring, various 
things that intuitively seem to be directly good for them. Regarding impli-
cation (a), then, hypothetical DF theories are in fairly good shape. But now 
consider implication (b): It seems sensible to think that fully and vividly 
informing people would rid them of plenty of their defective desires (i.e., 
their desires for things that intuitively do not seem to be directly good for 
them); however, it also seems sensible to think that some defective desires 
would remain even after their holders were fully and vividly informed. For 
example, it is doubtful that Donald Trump would lose his desire for money 
simply in virtue of his being fully and vividly informed with respect to 
non-evaluative facts (after all, he already knows all of the relevant non-
evaluative facts concerning money). And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes 
for certain reality TV stars’ desires for fame and Saddam Hussein’s desire 
for power.
13James Griffin, Well-Being (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 10. 
14Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1991). Augustine describes his loss of the desire to be a Manichee in Book 5 (see 5.7 and 5.14), 
and there he also denounces the Manichees as “false and deceiving” (see 5.10).
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Furthermore, there are problems that hypothetical DF theories have 
but that actual DF theories do not have. Perhaps the most damaging of 
these problems concerns the personality changes that fully and vividly 
informing people can bring about. Learning new facts can change one’s 
personality, sometimes significantly. Assume, then, that Lucille enters the 
hypothetical setting and undergoes a significant personality change while 
being fully and vividly informed. According to hypothetical DF theories, 
it is the desires of hypothetical Lucille that determine the well-being of 
actual Lucille. But this is hard to accept. After all, hypothetical Lucille and 
actual Lucille have significantly different personalities, and so it stands 
to reason that much of what hypothetical Lucille desires would not be 
prudentially fit for actual Lucille.15
We now have good (albeit, I admit, perhaps not decisive) reasons for 
rejecting DF theories in general.16 Moreover, the case that we now have 
against both welfare hedonism in general and DF theories in general can 
fairly easily be extended in such a way as to cover all welfare theories that 
are not at least partly objectivist (i.e., that are not either purely objectivist 
theories or hybrid theories). Thus it seems that the best general options 
that remain are that of adopting a purely objectivist welfare theory and 
that of adopting a hybrid welfare theory.
In this paper I will not choose between these two remaining general 
options. Both purely objectivist theories and hybrid theories are attrac-
tive. Both capture the sensible thought that a human’s well-being clusters 
around, and depends on, general goods such as friendship, accomplish-
ment, pleasure, health, aesthetic experience, and knowledge.
4. Defending Theses (4) and (5)
Thesis (4) of the naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-cleanly-together move asserts 
that both purely objectivist welfare theories and hybrid welfare theories 
are best understood as implying non-naturalism about well-being and ill-
being. Why should we accept this thesis? Here is the start of an answer. 
Both purely objectivist theories and hybrid theories entail the existence of 
the basic goods (i.e., pro-attitude independent goods such as friendship, 
pleasure, knowledge, accomplishment, health, and aesthetic experience). 
In virtue of this commitment, both purely objectivist theories and hybrid 
theories are committed to the existence of robust, objective values. Here 
“objective values” refers to values that are irreducible to mental states (i.e., 
mental states that humans have either individually or in some collective 
sense), and here “robust” signals that the objective values in question are 
15Regarding this personality-differences issue, see Connie Rosati, “Persons, Perspectives, 
and Full Information Accounts of the Good,” Ethics 105 (1995), 296–325. 
16In arguing against DF theories, I have relied on ideas contained in previous work. See 
William Lauinger, Well-Being and Theism: Linking Ethics to God (New York: Continuum, 2012), 
23–57.
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ones that take us beyond mental states in a way that is considerable.17 
What, though, does this talk of robust, objective values have to do with 
ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism?
The answer is this. The natural and social sciences aim to describe the 
world, but in a way that is non-evaluative, that is, in a way that involves no 
commitment to the existence (or non-existence) of normatively forceful 
values or disvalues. Therefore, if values are to fit into the framework of the 
natural and social sciences—that is, if values are to count as being purely 
naturalistic entities—then they need to be (entirely or almost entirely) 
reducible to something non-evaluative. The clearest and historically 
most common way to try to show that values are reducible to something 
non-evaluative is to try to show that they reduce to mental states, which, 
of course, can be understood non-evaluatively. However, we saw above 
(in section 3) that there are grave problems with welfare theories that 
entail that well-being and ill-being reduce to mental states; and, indeed, 
it seems that, instead of accepting one of these theories, we should accept 
a welfare theory that is at least partly objectivist. Of course, if we do 
that, then we must accept the existence of the basic goods, in which case 
we are committed to the existence of robust, objective values. Values of 
this sort (by definition) cannot be reduced to mental states. And, more 
than this, it is difficult to believe that there is anything non-evaluative 
that values of this sort can be (entirely or almost entirely) reduced to. It 
therefore seems that, in accepting the existence of the basic goods, we are 
committing ourselves to the existence of values that are at least partly 
non-natural.
Many lines of objection might now be put forward. Though I cannot 
discuss them all, I can discuss the two that seem to be the most important. 
The first questions my assumption that the natural and social sciences are 
committed to providing non-evaluative descriptions. The second grants 
this assumption but claims that the basic goods, though not reducible to 
mental states, nonetheless are reducible to something that can be under-
stood non-evaluatively.
Here is the first line of objection: “You claimed above that the natural 
and social sciences are committed to providing non-evaluative descrip-
tions. But biologists study and describe the health of organisms, and social 
scientists (e.g., psychologists) study and describe subjective well-being. 
Therefore values are part of the subject matter of the natural and social 
sciences. Perhaps, then, we can accept (a) that the basic goods exist, (b) 
that the basic goods are irreducibly evaluative, and (c) that the basic goods 
nonetheless fit into the framework of the natural and social sciences (i.e., 
are purely naturalistic entities).”
Remarks along these lines are sometimes made by philosophers (such as 
Sturgeon) who view ethics as being an a posteriori enterprise, in the same 
17To be clear, pleasure is a mental state, so it does not take us beyond mental states. How-
ever, the other basic goods do take us beyond mental states, and in a way that is considerable.
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way that the natural and social sciences are.18 My response here is this. 
Biologists do study health, and psychologists do study subjective well-
being. Further, I do not doubt that biologists generally assume that health 
is good and that psychologists generally assume that subjective well-being 
is good. Nevertheless, the claim “health is good in a normatively forceful 
sense” does not seem to be one that can be established within the domain 
of biology, and the claim “subjective well-being is good in a normatively 
forceful sense” does not seem to be one that can be established within 
the domain of psychology, at least not if we are construing psychology 
as a social science (as opposed to, say, construing it as a clinical field). 
Regarding the basic goods, then, natural and social scientists can certainly 
study them (e.g., psychologists can certainly study friendship), but only 
in a way that screens out their irreducibly evaluative character. Assuming 
that this is correct, the basic goods are not purely naturalistic entities.
The second line of objection is this: “Suppose that you are right that 
the natural and social sciences are committed to describing the world in 
a non-evaluative way. Does it follow that you are right that, in accepting 
the existence of the basic goods, we are accepting entities that are at least 
partly non-natural (i.e., entities that do not fit into the framework of the 
natural and social sciences)? No, this does not follow, for it is still open to 
us to claim that the basic goods are (entirely or almost entirely) reducible 
to something non-evaluative. True, in accepting the basic goods, we are 
accepting robust, objective values; and robust, objective values (by defini-
tion) cannot be reduced to mental states. However, we need not give up 
our belief that robust, objective values reduce to something non-evaluative 
simply because the mental-state-reduction route is blocked. After all, it 
may be that robust, objective values reduce to something non-evaluative, 
but that this (non-evaluative) reduction base is so complicated that we 
cannot capture it in our thought and language except by employing value-
laden terminology.”
Brink is among those philosophers who accept this way of thinking.19 
However, I find it to be more like a declaration of faith (i.e., in the compat-
ibility of ethical naturalism and robust, objective values) than a rationally 
motivated hypothesis. Think of the point this way. When ethical naturalists 
such as Railton and Lewis try to reduce values and disvalues to mental 
states, they are clearly doing something that is rationally motivated.20 
After all, values and disvalues as we intuitively think of them ordinarily 
do involve mental states in crucial ways, and therefore it is reasonable 
to try to see if there is a way of reducing values and disvalues to mental 
states. However, once this mental-state-reduction project is given up (and 
18Nicholas Sturgeon, “Ethical Naturalism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, ed. 
David Copp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 91–121.
19David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1989), 156–159. 
20See Railton, Facts, Values, and Norms, 43–68 and David Lewis, “Dispositional Theories of 
Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 63 (1989), 113–137. 
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Brink agrees with me that this project should be given up), there seems 
to be no good reason left for assuming that values and disvalues reduce 
to something non-evaluative.21 For, aside from the pleasures, pains, and 
desires of conscious beings (e.g., humans), it is incredibly difficult to think 
of anything non-evaluatively construable that values and disvalues might 
reduce to. Noting that it is possible (for all we know) that there is a (non-
evaluative) reduction base for robust, objective values hardly provides us 
with a reason for believing that there really is such a reduction base.
One might protest: “But Brink has done much more than just state that 
his position might be true, for all we know. After all, he has argued that we 
can understand ethical facts as being exhaustively constituted by natural 
facts, in a way that is similar to a table’s being exhaustively constituted 
by micro-physical particles.22 And Brink’s exhaustive constitution view re-
garding ethical facts seems true. Take any given ethical fact—say, the fact 
that what Prof has done is wrong. This ethical fact is wholly constituted by 
certain natural facts—say, by the fact that Prof told his students on Friday 
that he would grade their papers over the weekend, the fact that Prof de-
cided to watch football all weekend, and the fact that on Monday Prof did 
not give the students their papers back. All that we have here are natural 
facts. Yes, there is an ethical fact here, namely, the fact that what Prof has 
done is wrong. But still, it is not as though this ethical fact is anything over 
and above the natural facts that constitute it. We should not think, then, 
that this ethical fact is at all non-natural.”
Following FitzPatrick, we can note that, in fully accounting for any 
given ethical fact, we must (a) cite all of the natural facts that are in play 
and (b) relate these natural facts to whatever ethical standard is in play, be 
it the standard of well-being, or the standard of morality, or perhaps some 
other ethical standard.23 The ethical fact in question will not fall out until 
we take step (b). Proponents of Brink’s exhaustive constitution view take 
step (a) but fail to take step (b). If they were to take step (b), they would 
see that we must ask whether the ethical standard that is in play can be 
understood purely naturalistically or not. If it can be understood purely 
naturalistically, then the ethical fact that falls out when we take step (b) 
will be a purely natural fact—however, if this ethical standard cannot be 
understood purely naturalistically, then the ethical fact that falls out when 
we take step (b) will not be a purely natural fact. Reflection upon ethical 
standards tells us that the standard of well-being is the one that is most 
amenable to a purely naturalistic cashing out (it is certainly more ame-
nable to a purely naturalistic cashing out than the standard of morality is). 
However, assuming that what was said in section 3 is correct, the standard 
21Regarding Brink’s rejection of this mental-state-reduction project, see Moral Realism and 
the Foundations of Ethics, 217–236.
22Ibid., 156–159.
23William FitzPatrick, “Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity,” in 
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 3, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 159–205. 
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of well-being should not be understood in a way that reduces to mental 
states, and it should be understood in terms of the basic goods, which is 
to say that it should be understood in terms of robust, objective values. 
So we are back where we were before we considered Brink’s exhaustive 
constitution view—that is, we are back with robust, objective values, and 
we cannot think of anything non-evaluative that they might reduce to. 
Brink could reply that, although the standard of well-being should be 
understood in terms of robust, objective values (i.e., the basic goods), it is 
possible (for all we know) that these robust, objective values are somehow 
reducible to something non-evaluative. But, if Brink were so to reply, he 
would again be doing no more than stating that it might be true (for all we 
know) that ethical naturalism and robust, objective values are compatible 
with each other.24
At this point proponents of Draper-style arguments might say: “Maybe 
well-being and ill-being are best understood non-naturalistically; and, 
more generally, maybe theses (1)–(4) of the naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-
cleanly-together move are true. Still, thesis (5) must be considered. This 
thesis says that the truth of non-naturalism about well-being and ill-being 
does not fit cleanly with naturalism and, in fact, fits at least as well with 
theism as it does with naturalism. But this is questionable. Many excellent 
philosophers combine ethical non-naturalism with (metaphysical) natu-
ralism. For instance, Parfit, Wielenberg, and FitzPatrick all do this.25 And 
presumably they have good reasons for doing this.”
In effect, our question here is this: What explains the truth of ethical 
non-naturalism better, theism or naturalism? If the correct answer is either 
“theism” or “there is a tie,” thesis (5) stands. But, if the correct answer is 
“naturalism,” thesis (5) falls. In assessing this matter, we should consider 
both metaphysical and epistemological issues.
Metaphysical Issues: Suppose that a theistic ethical non-naturalist says, 
“The metaphysical discontinuity between the natural order and non-
natural values is not awkward on theism, for theism already entails there 
is at least one very important entity (namely, God) that exists outside the 
boundaries of the natural order. However, given naturalism, this meta-
physical discontinuity is very awkward.” What might the naturalist who 
accepts ethical non-naturalism say in response? Following Parfit, he or 
she might say: It is not true that, given naturalism, there is an awkward 
metaphysical discontinuity between the natural order and non-natural 
values—this is not true because non-natural values are not metaphysical 
things at all. Parfit says: “Like numbers and logical truths, [non-natural] 
normative properties and truths have no ontological status.”26 Part of what 
24For more on Brink’s exhaustive constitution view and FitzPatrick’s reasons for rejecting 
it, see Lauinger, Well-Being and Theism, 131–135.
25Derek Parfit, On What Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Erik Wielen-
berg, “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism,” Faith and Philosophy 26 
(2009), 23–41; and FitzPatrick, “Robust Ethical Realism, Non-Naturalism, and Normativity.”
26Parfit, On What Matters, 487.
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Parfit is thinking here is that debates between Platonists and nominalists 
about the reality of numbers are unclear. If we ask whether “numbers re-
ally exist in a fundamental, ontological sense, though they do not exist in 
space or time,” we are, says Parfit, asking a question that is too unclear to 
answer.27 Instead of answering “yes” (as Platonists do) or “no” (as nomi-
nalists do), we should, Parfit believes, accept a third answer, one that says 
that numbers exist, but not in any ontological sense.28 And, mutatis mutandis, 
Parfit holds the same view about logical truths and non-natural normative 
properties and truths (or, for short, non-natural values).
I find it oxymoronic-sounding to speak of things that have a non- 
ontological existence, for existence seems by definition to be an ontological 
category. We may not be able adequately to describe the precise ontological 
way in which numbers, logical truths, and non-natural values exist, as 
there may be no extant ontological category or concept that adequately 
captures the precise ontological way in which these things exist. But still, 
if we want to reject anti-realism about these things (as Parfit does), then 
presumably we must accept that they exist in some ontological way or other.
Notice, moreover, that theists can provide an answer that differs from 
both the Platonist and nominalist answers mentioned above. As Plantinga 
has said, theists can claim that numbers and other abstract objects exist 
necessarily, but in such a way that they are divine thoughts.29 On this the-
istic view, we have numbers and other abstract objects existing necessarily, 
but in a way that involves their being grounded in a concrete, necessarily 
existing object, namely, God. Thus, on this theistic view, Platonists are right 
to think of numbers and other abstract objects as existing necessarily, but 
wrong to think of numbers and other abstract objects as existing in a free-
floating way, that is, without being grounded in any concrete object.
Regarding my favored version of ethical non-naturalism: I am inclined 
to think that there are some basic, necessarily existing non-natural values 
that are uncreated entities that have always been contained in God’s mind, 
that is, as divine thoughts. There is some kind of dependence here, but it 
is not causal: The basic non-natural values that necessarily exist depend 
on God in that they are thoughts that God essentially has, but it is not true 
to say that God has ever caused them to exist or ever produced them.30 
I realize that this non-causal dependence is obscure.31 Nevertheless, it 
27Ibid., 476.
28Ibid., 481.
29Alvin Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2011), 288.
30Here I seem to be parting ways with Plantinga, since he seems to think that abstract 
objects that are divine thoughts are caused by God to exist (ibid., 291).
31To see what this non-causal dependence might look like, see pp. 269–271 (i.e., the section 
on “Divine Conceptualism”) in Paul Gould, “The Problem of God and Abstract Objects,” 
Philosophia Christi 13 (2011), 255–274. One further obscurity in my version of ethical non-
naturalism: As an anonymous referee noted, it is natural to think that thoughts in humans 
are always concrete mental events, but to assume, as I am doing, that abstract objects such 
as necessarily existent non-natural values are divine thoughts is to assume that there can be 
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seems less obscure to construe non-natural values as being non-causally 
grounded in God in the way that I am suggesting than it is to embrace 
Parfit’s oxymoronic-sounding claim that non-natural values have a non-
ontological existence.
Of course, one can be a naturalist who accepts ethical non-naturalism 
without accepting Parfit’s claim. Wielenberg seems to be one such 
naturalist. Also, Wielenberg might say that his combination of ethical non-
naturalism and naturalism is, in relation to metaphysics, superior to my 
combination of ethical non-naturalism and theism.
There are (at least) two points that Wielenberg might make here. First, 
he might note that his view is ontologically simpler than my view in that 
my view entails the existence of at least one more entity (i.e., God) than 
does his view. Second, he might make a point about supervenience: He 
might note that, when it comes to the task of explaining the relationship 
between the natural order and non-natural values, his view and my view 
are on a par in that both views entail that there are brute, metaphysically 
necessary connections that obtain between the natural order and non-
natural values (e.g., both views entail that it is a brute, metaphysically 
necessary truth that pain has the property of intrinsic badness, where pain 
belongs to the natural order, and where intrinsic badness is a supervening 
non-natural property).32
I grant that, if we are counting the number of entities posited by a view, 
then Wielenberg’s view has an advantage over my view. Further, I am 
willing to grant (at least for the sake of argument) that, when it comes to 
supervenience and the positing of brute, metaphysically necessary con-
nections between the natural order and non-natural values, Wielenberg’s 
view and my view are on a par. However, there is also a Bayesian question 
to consider in this context, namely, the question of whether the existence 
of non-natural values is antecedently more probable on theism or on 
naturalism. And the correct answer here, I believe, is that the existence of 
non-natural values is antecedently many times more probable on theism 
than on naturalism.
Think of the point this way. Since theists already accept that there is 
an all-good God that is ontologically fundamental and that does not fit 
within the boundaries of the natural order, it is not all that surprising, 
given theism, that there would be non-natural values, that is, normatively 
forceful values that do not fit within the boundaries of the natural order. 
But now turn to naturalism. On naturalism, there is the natural, causal 
order, and this order is sufficient unto itself in that it needs only its own 
matter and laws to operate. Furthermore, on naturalism, humans are 
divine thoughts that are not concrete. My (tentative) response: Given the differences between 
God’s nature and human nature, it seems reasonable to think that there are probably some 
differences between God’s thoughts and humans’ thoughts; in turn, it does not seem unrea-
sonable to think that, even if all human thoughts are concrete occurrences, there nonetheless 
can be thoughts in God’s mind that are abstract objects.
32Wielenberg, “In Defense of Non-Natural, Non-Theistic Moral Realism,” 28.
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wholly physical (i.e., not-at-all immaterial) beings, ones that have been 
produced by the purely natural process of unguided evolution. So, given 
naturalism, would we expect there to be non-natural values, that is, nor-
matively forceful values that are utterly central to the lives of humans and 
that do not fit within the boundaries of the natural order? I do not think 
that we would expect this at all. I think what we would expect, given natu-
ralism, is either for there to be nothing non-natural at all or for there to 
be some rather unimportant non-natural entities. Given naturalism, we 
certainly would not expect there to be non-natural entities that are of the 
utmost importance (i.e., that are, to echo the title of Parfit’s book, what 
matters).
Wainwright has (in effect) already made this Bayesian point. At the end 
of an article responding to Wielenberg, Wainwright says:
In a theistic or Platonic World, the Good lies at the heart of reality. The ex-
istence of [non-natural] objective values . . . [is] surely less surprising in a 
world of this sort than in a world in which what is deepest is matter, energy, 
natural law, or chance. While the existence of [non-natural] objective values 
is formally consistent with a naturalistic metaphysics, it doesn’t comport 
well with it.33
I do not see a plausible response that a naturalist might offer here, except, 
perhaps, to voice a general suspicion about Bayesian ways of thinking. 
However, it is not open to proponents of Draper-style arguments to voice 
any such general suspicion, for Draper-style arguments are themselves 
Bayesian arguments.
Summing up: Given that the existence of non-natural values is anteced-
ently many times more probable on theism than on naturalism, it seems 
safe to say that, in relation to metaphysics, the truth of ethical non-natu-
ralism is explained at least as well by theism as it is by naturalism. Thus, 
in relation to metaphysics, thesis (5) seems to be in good shape.
Epistemological Issues: Ethical non-naturalists standardly assume that 
we have the cognitive ability to access non-natural values, and to do so in 
a way that is reliable or truth-tracking. This ability of ours is very puzzling 
from a naturalistic point of view. For why would unguided evolution (i.e., 
a mindless, purely natural process concerned with reproductive fitness 
and survival) work out in such a way as to provide us with the ability to 
access values that are not themselves any part of the natural, causal order?
On theism, there is less of a puzzle here. After all, theists might say: God 
made us with immaterial minds that have a power of rational intuition 
that allows us to access non-natural values. Or theists might say: We are 
not at all immaterial, but in creating the natural world God set up the laws 
of nature and the cosmic initial conditions in such a way as to guarantee 
not only that we would arise from evolutionary processes, but also that 
evolutionary processes would build into us a faculty of rational intuition 
33William Wainwright, “In Defense of Non-Natural Theistic Realism: A Response to 
Wielenberg,” Faith and Philosophy 27 (2010), 463.
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that allows us to access non-natural values. And, aside from these two 
options, there may be others available to theists.
Now consider naturalists. How might they account for our ability to 
access non-natural values? Here I will focus on Parfit’s view. Parfit holds 
that it is plausible to assume that unguided evolution built into us a gen-
eral cognitive ability to access various kinds of truths (e.g., mathematical, 
logical, and evaluative truths) that are not themselves any part of the 
natural, causal order. Regarding our ability to access mathematical truths, 
Parfit thinks that the following occurred. Through random genetic muta-
tion, some early humans or pre-humans came to be able to access simple 
mathematical truths (e.g., the truth that 2 + 1 = 3). Having this ability helped 
these early humans or pre-humans to survive (e.g., being able to count the 
number of lions nearby helped them to avoid being eaten by lions). Since 
this ability to access simple mathematical truths was survival-enhancing, 
it was favored by natural selection and hence was passed down from gen-
eration to generation for many thousands of years, often being slightly 
improved along the way.34 Eventually humans found that they were able 
to access a large domain of mathematical truths, many of which have no 
clear connection to reproductive fitness or survival. Parfit elaborates:
Our cognitive abilities, we can assume, were partly produced by evolution-
ary forces. But these abilities later ceased to be governed by these forces, and 
had their own effects. Natural selection gave us wings, but when we could 
fly, we soared into the sky. We used these cognitive abilities to discover new 
kinds of truths. Nagel gives, as one example, our understanding of arith-
metical infinity.35
Parfit thinks of our ability to access non-natural evaluative truths as flowing 
out of our general cognitive ability to access non-natural truths of various 
sorts. On Parfit’s view, our non-natural evaluative beliefs were not mostly 
produced by evolutionary forces; even so, evolutionary forces are respon-
sible for our having the general cognitive ability to access non-natural truths 
of various sorts, and we use this general cognitive ability—Parfit often re-
fers to it as rational reflection—to access non-natural evaluative truths.36
How convincing is this? Parfit’s story about the evolutionary origin of 
our ability to access simple mathematical truths is plausible, for knowing 
basic arithmetic clearly is survival-enhancing. Thus Parfit has a plausible 
account of how humans began to access the domain of truths that are not 
contained within the natural, causal order. However, the assumptions 
that Parfit makes after this—for instance, about how our cognitive abili-
ties later ceased to be governed by evolutionary forces and had their own 
effects, ones which allowed us to soar “into the sky” (i.e., to access im-
portant truths not contained within the natural, causal order, including 
34Parfit, On What Matters, 496.
35Ibid., 520.
36Ibid., 534–542.
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non-natural evaluative truths)—are questionable. In general, the problem 
with Parfit’s story—and this problem seems to afflict all naturalistic stories 
of how humans have come to be able to access non-natural values in a 
reliable or truth-tracking way—is that, to a significant extent, it makes our 
ability to access non-natural values appear to be an accident (i.e., a lucky 
side-effect of evolutionary processes). Explaining our ability to access 
non-natural values as something that is, to a significant extent, an accident 
would presumably be acceptable if non-natural values were things that 
are relatively unimportant. But, given that non-natural values are utterly 
central to our lives, it seems implausible to claim that our ability to access 
non-natural values is, to a significant extent, an accident.37 Given theism, 
we need not posit that our ability to access non-natural values is (to any 
extent) an accident, and, insofar as this is so, theism has a significant ex-
planatory advantage over naturalism.38 In line with this, it seems safe to 
say that, in relation to epistemology, the truth of ethical non-naturalism is 
explained at least as well by theism as it is by naturalism.
In sum, I have argued that, in relation to both metaphysics and episte-
mology, the truth of ethical non-naturalism is explained at least as well by 
theism as it is by naturalism. Assuming my argument is sound, it follows 
that thesis (5) stands.
5. The Red-herring Objection
I will now discuss one additional objection that proponents of Draper-style 
arguments might raise when confronted with the naturalism-and-evil-do-
not-fit-cleanly-together move. Call this the red-herring objection. Here is how 
it goes: “Draper-style arguments start with an observation of the patterns 
of well-being and ill-being that the world contains. Then Draper-style ar-
guments ask: Are these patterns better explained by the hypothesis that 
there is an all-good, omniscient, and omnipotent being that is ontologi-
cally fundamental or, instead, by the hypothesis that naturalism is true 
and, by extension, that what lies at the base of reality is indifferent matter 
that swirls around in accordance with similarly indifferent laws of nature? 
37I have stressed this point before (Well-Being and Theism, 139–140).
38Enoch finds it misleading to speak of humans’ access to non-natural values, since hu-
mans can form true beliefs about non-natural values without accessing them—see David 
Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 174. On Enoch’s view, what we must explain are simply the correlations between 
humans’ (often true) evaluative beliefs and the non-natural evaluative truths that indepen-
dently hold. However, even if we accept Enoch’s framing of the problem, it still seems true 
that, when naturalists who accept ethical non-naturalism respond here, they inevitably end 
up positing that the human ability to form largely true evaluative beliefs is, to a significant 
extent, an accident. For example, see Erik Wielenberg, “On the Evolutionary Debunking of 
Morality,” Ethics 120 (2010), 441–464. In particular, see pp. 459–461, where (a) Wielenberg 
notes that his account of moral knowledge (which does not require us to access non-natural 
values) requires there to be a certain coincidence of ethical supervenience relationships and 
the laws of nature and (b) Wielenberg more or less admits that, if we reject (i) theism, (ii) 
Nagel’s teleological naturalism, and (iii) the (very controversial) claim that the laws of nature 
hold with metaphysical necessity, then we will probably have to say that the obtaining of this 
coincidence is an accident.
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Draper-style arguments answer that the latter hypothesis does a much 
better job of explaining the patterns in question (e.g., if we observe a four-
year-old who undergoes a year of painful treatment for brain cancer, only 
to die in the end, then we should conclude that the naturalistic hypothesis 
does a much better job of explaining the ill-being observed here than the 
theistic hypothesis does). Moreover, there is nothing more that needs to be 
delved into here—in particular, there is no need to determine what theory 
of the nature of well-being and ill-being is correct, and there certainly is 
no need to delve into a meta-ethical debate about whether well-being and 
ill-being should be understood in an ethical-naturalist way or, instead, in 
an ethical-non-naturalist way. Indeed, the naturalism-and-evil-do-not-fit-
cleanly-together move is really a red herring, for it tries to force us to focus 
on issues that are not directly relevant to the question ‘Which hypothesis 
better explains the patterns of well-being and ill-being that we find in the 
world, the indifference-naturalism hypothesis or the theism hypothesis?’. 
If (as we should) we simply restrict ourselves to this question and refrain 
from delving into disputes about theories of well-being and ill-being 
and ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism, then we will see that 
Draper-style arguments are sound.”
I grant that, if we leave “well-being” and “ill-being” unspecified (i.e., 
leave them to be used in a way that is not made more specific by a theory 
of the nature of well-being and ill-being) and refrain from delving into 
debates about ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism, then Draper-
style arguments may well strike us as sound. But it is not a red herring, in 
this context, to ask (a) what the true natures of well-being and ill-being are 
and (b) whether well-being and ill-being are best construed in an ethical-
naturalist way or in an ethical-non-naturalist way. Draper-style arguments 
start with an observation of the patterns of well-being and ill-being that 
the world contains. Given this starting point, it seems appropriate to ask 
“How, exactly, should we understand the terms ‘well-being’ and ‘ill-being’ 
here—that is, what is the true nature of well-being and ill-being?” If it is 
answered (as it should be) that well-being and ill-being are best understood 
in an at least partly objectivist way, then at that point it seems appropriate 
to ask, first, whether well-being and ill-being, so understood, fit within 
the boundaries of the natural order and, second, whether well-being and 
ill-being, if understood non-naturalistically, fit better with theism or with 
naturalism. In saying that this last, two-part question seems like an appro-
priate one to ask, I have in mind the general context (i.e., we are discussing 
Draper-style arguments, which are arguments for naturalism over theism) 
and two further points: first, the point that many philosophers seriously 
doubt that objective values fit within the boundaries of the natural order 
and, second, the point that many philosophers believe that ethical non-
naturalism fits poorly with naturalism. Given this general context and 
given these two further points, I do not see how it could rightly be consid-
ered a distraction to ask this last, two-part question.
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Proponents of Draper-style arguments might protest: “You have clearly 
missed the point of the red-herring objection. To keep things simple, go 
back to the case of the four-year-old who dies from brain cancer. When we 
consider this case and the ill-being that it contains, we are apt to see the 
world as being fundamentally indifferent. This fundamental indifference 
fits well with naturalism and poorly with theism. And that is all that needs 
to be said here.”
But that is not all that needs to be said here. For we should provide as 
full a characterization of the ill-being contained in this case as we can; and, 
once we do that, we will find ourselves construing the ill-being contained 
in this case non-naturalistically, at which point it will no longer be clear 
that this case fits well with naturalism and, in turn, at which point it will 
no longer be clear that naturalism has an explanatory edge over theism 
with respect to this case.
To be clear, I am well aware that theism has a serious explanatory 
problem when it comes to cases of terrible evil and suffering such as the 
one from just above. My main point in this paper has been that naturalism 
also has a serious explanatory problem when it comes to cases of this sort. 
This main point is important, for it allows for an effective neutralization of 
Draper-style arguments.39
Chestnut Hill College
39Thanks to Paul Draper, Tom Flint, two anonymous referees from Faith and Philosophy, 
and two readers from another journal for very helpful comments.
